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COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND CONFLICT OF LAWS





T HE subject matter of this article concerns the area where the
fields of oil and gas law, community property law and con-
flict of laws overlap. This area is of importance for two reasons.
First, the community property system, while it is in force in only
eight out of the forty-eight states of the Union, is the law in
Texas, Louisiana and California, which are three of the largest
oil-producing states. Therefore, an understanding of this system
is of importance to every married owner of oil properties located
in any one of these three states. Second, the tax advantages of
investments in oil and gas properties for persons with large in-
comes have induced an increasing flow of capital into the oil and
gas industries of these states from out-of-state investors. Whenever
a married domiciliary of one state invests in oil and gas prop-
erties located in another state, the question is raised as to what
law will govern the marital property rights of his spouse in such
property, the law of the domicile or the law of the situs - i.e.,
a problem of conflict of laws.
This discussion will be confined to the laws of the three com-
munity property states which are of major significance so far as
the oil and gas industry is concerned - Texas, Louisiana and
California. Because of the wide divergencies between the com-
munity property laws of the eight states where that system has
been adopted, it is impossible to discuss American "community
property law" in general. There is no such thing. The discussion
will also be confined to the problems arising when a married man
domiciled in one of the non-community property states acquires
*B.A., Rice Institute, 1939; LL.B., University of Texas, 1942; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1947; Jur.Sc.D., Columbia University, 1951; currently engaged in private
practice in San Francisco, California.
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oil and gas properties in one of these three community property
states. Because of the divergencies mentioned between the com-
munity property laws of the various states, similar problems may
also arise where a domiciliary of one community state - Cali-
fornia, for example - acquires oil and gas properties in another
community state such as Texas. However, it will not be possible
to deal with these problems within the scope of this article.
In considering the various principles of law involved in this
subject, it would be helpful to have before us a concrete situation
illustrating the type of practical problems the answer to which
may depend upon these principles.
Suppose that Mr. and Mrs. Smith are, at all pertinent times,
domiciled in St. Louis, Missouri. Smith, a petroleum engineer,
goes to East Texas at the time of the discovery of the East Texas
oil field. He spends a majority of his time there for the next three
years, although remaining domiciled in St. Louis. He acquires the
following properties in Texas:
Tract A. Two of Smith's friends in St. Louis give him $20,000
to invest in oil properties in Texas, and agree that in return for
his services in scouting for the properties he is to receive a one-
third interest in any property purchased. With this $20,000 Smith
acquires the leasehold interest in Tract A. This property is drilled
under the supervision of Smith and a producing well results.
Smith purchases a building in St. Louis in 1939 with $250,000
received from his one-third working interest. The building now
has a fair market value of $1,000,000.
Tract B. Smith leases Tract B for a $10,000 bonus payment,
which he pays from funds acquired by him in Missouri. This
property also is drilled under the supervision of Smith. The drill-
ing costs are paid with a portion of Smith's share of the proceeds
of oil runs on Tract A. This property also produces. With
$200,000 received from his working interest in this property,
Smith purchases General Motors stock having a present market
value of $400,000.
Tract C. Smith purchases the mineral interest in Tract C for
$5,000, which he pays from his funds acquired in Missouri. He
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leases this property to a major oil company for a bonus payment
of $50,000. The property is drilled and produces. With funds
received as bonus and royalty payments from Tract C, Smith
purchases over the years other Texas oil properties now having
a fair market value of $2,000,000.
In 1955 Mrs. Smith dies testate, and the son of Mr. and Mrs.
Smith is the sole beneficiary under her will. After the death of
Mrs. Smith, Mr. Smith sells the building in St. Louis for $1,000,-
000 in cash, and he sells certain of his Texas oil holdings other
than Tracts A, B and C for $1,000,000 in cash.
In 1956 Smith dies testate before filing his income tax return
for 1955. The son is the sole beneficiary and executor under
Smith's will. He qualifies also as administrator cum testamento
annexo in the estate of Mrs. Smith and files an estate tax return
in her estate listing all of the above mentioned property as com-
munity property and showing one-half thereof taxable in her
estate. He files an income tax return for Mr. Smith for 1955
showing the basis of the St. Louis building and the Texas oil
properties as the fair market value at the date of Mrs. Smith's
death and no tax due on either of the above mentioned sales.
He files an estate tax return in the estate of Mr. Smith showing
only one-half of the above property as taxable in his estate. The
Commissioner assesses deficiencies on all of the tax returns. What
result?
To attempt a solution of the problems raised by these facts,
it is necessary to review a number of aspects of the law of oil
and gas, community property, conflict of laws, and taxation.
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE NATURE OF OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES
ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE
The first question to be discussed is the community or separate
nature under the laws of California, Louisiana and Texas of oil
and gas properties acquired during marriage. The general rule
in the community property states is that property acquired before
marriage and that acquired by gift, devise or descent after mar-
riage is separate property; all other property is community
[Vol. 10
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property.1 From this statement of the rule it would appear to be
a relatively simple matter to determine whether a given property
is separate or community. However, the rule is modified by an-
other rule developed by the courts, namely, that separate prop-
erty, so long as it can be clearly traced and identified, will remain
separate property despite changes and mutations or exchanges
of the original separate property for other property, real or
personal.' Therefore, property acquired during marriage other-
wise than by gift, devise or descent, although it is presumptively
community property, may be shown to be in fact separate prop-
erty by showing that the consideration for it was separate.
This doctrine of "tracing," as it is called, is applied in Texas
and California to any property whether real or personal and
whether acquired by the husband or by the wife. However, in
Louisiana it is modified by the so-called "earmarking require-
ment." In Louisiana, if a husband purchases immovable property
with his separate funds, the property becomes community unless
the husband has inserted in the instrument of conveyance to him
what is called a "double declaration."' This "double declaration"
consists of two recitals- that the property was purchased with
the separate funds of the husband and that his intention was to
purchase it for the benefit of his separate estate. One recital alone
will not do; both must be made in order to preserve the separate
character of the property acquired.4
The husband has a right of reimbursement against the com-
munity estate upon its dissolution for the amount of the purchase
price where his separate funds thus go to acquire property for
the benefit of the community estate. But since ownership of the
property is in the community, any increase in value of the prop-
erty purchased would accrue to the benefit of the community
estate, and of course any income from the property would be
community.
I CAL. CIV. CODE (1872), §162, 163, 164; TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (1925), arts. 4613,
4614, 4619; cf. Art. 2402, LA. CIv. CODE of 1870. There are a number of exceptions to
this general rule, and they vary from state to state.
2 Huie, The Community Property Law of Texas, 13 VEnNoN's ANN. TEx. Civ. STATS.
ix-x (1951); McMurray, Community Property, 3, CAL. JuR. TEN-YEAR Supp. 520-522
(1936).
8 Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So.2d 841 (1951); SIaton v. King, 214 La. 89,
36 So.2d 648 (1948) ; Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1940).
4 See Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So.2d 841, 843 (1951).
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This "earmarking requirement," according to the latest de-
cisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court,5 does not apply to a
purchase of movable property by the husband. Nor does it apply
to an exchange of one immovable for another.'
The requirement does not apply at all to the wife, who is per-
mitted to show by parol evidence that any property, movable or
immovable, was purchased with her separate funds under her
administration, and thus to preserve the separate character of the
property acquired.'
The application of these principles to a case where a married
person acquires a mineral or royalty interest during marriage
does not ordinarily raise any special problems not arising with
respect to other types of property. If such a mineral or royalty
interest is acquired by gift, devise or descent it is separate prop-
erty of the spouse acquiring it. It is also separate property if
purchased with the separate funds of one spouse, with the excep-
tion that in Louisiana a mineral or royalty interest purchased by
the husband with his separate funds is community property unless
the required "double declaration" is inserted in the deed by which
he acquires the interest. Such an interest otherwise acquired
during marriage - for example, in return for the services of one
of the spouses or by purchase with community funds - is com-
munity property.
In the case of a working interest acquired by one of the spouses
during marriage there are some special considerations. If an oil
and gas lease is acquired without any bonus payment, or with only
a nominal bonus, the actual consideration for the lease is the
implied or express covenants regarding the development and
operation of the property. If a husband acquires such a lease
during marriage, these obligations are obligations for which the
community estate is liable. In addition, where the husband is in
the oil business, he normally spends considerable time and effort
5 Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So.2d 377 (1955) ; Bruyninckx v. Wood-
ward, 217 La. 736, 47 So.2d 478 (1950) ; cf. Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723
(1925). Earlier cases seem to be contra, and have not been specifically overruled:
Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 214 La. 905, 39 So.2d 338 (1949); Fleming v. Fleming, 211
La. 860, 30 So.2d 860 (1947).
6 See Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So.2d 648, 650 (1948).
7 Guilbeau v. Guilbeau, 224 La. 837, 71 So.2d 129 (1954) ; American Surety Co. v.
Noble & Salter, 196 La. 312, 199 So. 131 (1940) ; Miller v. Miller, 160 La. 936, 107 So.
702 (1926) ; Otis v. Texas Co., 153 La. 384, 96 So. 1 (1923).
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in determining what properties to take under lease and in negoti-
ating for and acquiring the particular properties which he does
lease; in fact, his entire business may consist exclusively of such
activities. Will a leasehold interest which he thus acquires be his
separate property merely because a small bonus paymentis made
from his separate funds acquired before marriage? If so, the
result may be that although the husband has accumulated a large
estate during the course of a long married life, there will be no
community property whatever in his estate.
These considerations would seem to justify a holding that a
leasehold interest thus acquired by a husband is community prop-
erty; and the Texas Supreme Court so held in the recent case of
Norris v. Vaughan' where only a nominal bonus was paid for the
leasehold. The court based its holding on the personal effort
expended by the husband in acquiring the leasehold, rather than
the community obligations assumed in the lease. The court further
held in that case that the character of the leasehold was fixed at
the time of its acquisition, and therefore the fact that it was
subsequently developed with separate funds would not change its
character, although it would give the separate estate of the hus-
band a claim for reimbursement against the community estate
for the funds thus spent for its benefit.
Suppose, however, that a substantial bonus - say $20,000
is paid for the lease in these circumstances from the separate
funds of the husband. Clearly, the bonus payment is at least part
of the consideration for the lease, and under the Texas decisions,
property acquired in part for a community consideration and in
part for a separate consideration is owned in common by the two
estates in the proportion in which they contributed the considera-
tion. But how can it be determined what portion of the leasehold
is attributable to the separate consideration and what portion to
the efforts of the husband in acquiring it (and the development
obligations assumed in the lease, if those are to be considered)?
It would seem impossible to make such a determination on any
rational basis. The sensible rule in these circumstances would
seem to be the Louisiana rule in the absence of any earmarking,
i.e., to hold that the leasehold is community property and the
8 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
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husband's separate estate has a right of reimbursement for the
amount of the bonus. However, in Texas such a solution seems
precluded by the prior decisions, and the courts appear to be
committed to making such an allocation.
The foregoing rule probably does not apply to a carried work-
ing interest which is purchased by the husband with his separate
funds. The husband in such circumstances is in the position of an
investor rather than one engaging in a "business," and it has
always been recognized that the husband has a right to spend
some portion of his time and effort in investing his separate funds
without thereby making the resulting investments community
property.
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE NATURE OF INCOME RECEIVED DURING
MARRIAGE FROM OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES
Assuming that the community or separate nature of the royalty
or working interest has been determined, the next question is the
nature of the income received therefrom during marriage. If the
underlying property itself has been determined to be community
property, then in all of the community states the income there-
from and any increase in the value thereof are also community
property.
However, if the property has been determined to be separate
property, the nature of the returns therefrom depends upon the
jurisdiction involved. In California, income from separate prop-
erty is also separate property, as well as any increase in the value
thereof.9 In Texas and in Louisiana, on the other hand, income
from separate property is community property. This rule applies,
however, only to a periodic return from the property- some-
times called "rents and revenues" 1"- and not to an increase in
the value of the property itself. Such a profit in the nature of
a capital gain from separate property is also held to be separate
property even in Texas and Louisiana.
There is a further qualification in the Louisiana law concerning
the income from the wife's separate property. If the wife has
9 CAL. CIV. CODE (1872), §§162, 163; George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860).
10 See the use of this phrase in TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. (1925), art. 4623; cf. LA.
CIv. CODE of 1870, art. 2386.
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recorded a notorized statement of her intention to reserve the
fruits of her separate property and to administer it separately, the
income from the wife's separate property perforce will also be her
separate property.11 This privilege is not given to the husband, and
the income from his separate property falls into the community
estate.' 2
How do these principles apply to the income from separately
owned oil and gas properties? With respect to the income from
mineral and royalty interests, it is clear that in California all
such income is separate property, since any income from or
increase in the value of separate property is itself separate. In
Texas and in Louisiana, however, it is necessary to determine
whether such income constitutes "rents and revenues," which are
community, or is in the nature of a capital gain from the property,
which is separate.
In Texas an ordinary oil and gas lease is considered to be a
conveyance of a determinable fee in 7/8ths of the oil and gas in
place, with the mineral owner retaining ownership of 1/8th of
the oil and gas in place. Because of this theory, it has been held
that bonuses 3 and royalties 4 from separately owned property are
the consideration for the sale of a portion of the corpus of the
land and are, therefore, in the nature of a capital gain; hence,
they are held to be separate property. On the other hand, delay
rentals, because they accrue merely by the lapse of time and do
not exhaust the substance of the land, are considered to be like
other rentals and are held to be community property, even when
paid with respect to separate land."
In Louisiana the same community property theory prevails,
11 LA. CiV. CODE of 1870, art. 2386; Matthews v. Hansberry, 71 So.2d 232 (La.
App. 1954).
12 Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); United States v.
Burglass, 172 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949).
"sTexas Co. v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.;
Lessing v. Russek, 234 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; Crabb v.
Comm'r, 119 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Cornm'r v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935);
Ferguson v. Comm'r, 45 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1930).
14 Bantuelle v. Bantuelle, 195 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Stephens v.
Stephens, 292 S.W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.; McFaddin v. Comm'r,
148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Turbeville v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1936);
Comm'r v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935); Ghesson v. Comm'r, 57 F.2d 141
(5th Cir. 1932).
15 McGarraugh v. McGarraugh, 177 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error dism.;
Bennett v. Scofield, 170 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1948); Comm'r v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1935.)
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but a different theory of oil and gas law. There the landowner is
not considered to have any ownership of the oil and gas beneath
his land prior to the "capture" thereof, and an oil and gas lease
is held to be governed by the provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code relating to ordinary leases. Both bonuses and royalties are
characterized as "rent" paid under the lease. This theory of oil
and gas law has led the Louisiana Supreme Court to hold that
all bonus and royalty payments, as well as delay rental payments,
received from separate property are "rents and revenues," and
therefore community property.'" The wife could, of course, pre-
serve the separate character of all such payments with respect to
her separate property by recording the notarized statement above
mentioned.
What about the income from working interests separately owned
by one of the spouses? In California and Louisiana the answer
would seem to be fairly clear in view of the foregoing holdings.
In California such income would be separate property, and in
Louisiana it would be community property.'" In Louisiana the
wife would have the same privilege of preserving the separate
character of the income from her separately owned leaseholds.
In Texas the answer is not as clear. Since the lessee is consid-
ered to be the owner of 7/8ths of the oil and gas in place, and
the corpus of that estate is depleted by the production and sale
of a portion of the oil, it would seem that the income from a
separately owned leasehold should be considered in the nature
of a capital gain and therefore to be separate property. There is no
doubt that this would be true in the case of a carried interest
where the spouse owning the property expended no community
funds or individual effort in the development or operation of the
property. What about the cases, however, where (1) the lease-
hold is separately owned by the husband before marriage, but he
spends community funds and individual effort in drilling and
operating the property after marriage, or (2) the leasehold is
separately owned by the husband and has already been drilled
before marriage with separate funds, but the husband spends
16 Milling v. Collector, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952). This case overruled two
prior decisions in the Fifth Circuit: United States v. Harang, 165 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1948) ; Comm'r v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
17 As to California, see Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal. App.2d 128,274 P.2d 951 (1954).
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community funds and individual effort in supervising the opera-
tion of the property after marriage.
To take the second question first, the Texas Supreme Court held
in Norris v. Vaughan18 that the mere expenditure of community
funds and efforts in the operation and maintenance of gas wells
which were separately owned by the husband and were producing
properties at the time of marriage did not convert the income
from such properties into community property. However, the court
qualified this holding by stating that in that particular case "there
was not such an expenditure of community funds or effort as to
impress community character on the gas produced.. ."" (em-
phasis added). This suggests that when the community effort
reaches a certain level on some judicial scale, the income from
the separately owned leasehold is suddenly transformed into com-
munity property. But the Supreme Court in Norris v. Vaughan
does not even give a hint as to what the nature of this scale may
be or at what point on it this magical transformation takes place.
It may be conjectured, although the court does not expressly say
so, that the court which decided Norris v. Vaughan would hold
that if community funds and effort were used to drill, as well as
operate a separately owned leasehold, the income therefrom would
be community property. In 1934 the General Counsel of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue so ruled with regard to Texas law.2"
Two ancient Texas authorities allegedly holding that bricks
made from clay taken from separate land2' and finished lumber
sawed from separate timber22 by community effort were com-
munity property have been cited to support this result.2" The
latter case is clearly not in point since it merely held that timber
grown on the wife's separate land was community property, and
of course the lumber sawed from the timber was also community
property. There is no reported opinion in the former case, but
merely a bald statement of the holding in Willson's digest of
cases decided by the old Court of Appeals. The basis of the de-
's 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
1' ld. at 498, 260 S.W.2d at 680.
20 G.C.M. 13742, XIII-2 CuM. BULL. 181 (1934).
21 Craxton, Wood & Co. v. Ryan, 3 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. §367 (1888).
22 White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195 (1862).
28 See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 498, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953) ; XIII-2
CuM. BULL. 181, 183 (1934).
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cision may have been a feeling that the bricks were a different
substance than the clay; that they were therefore new property
acquired during marriage otherwise than by gift, devise or descent,
and hence were community property. Whether or not we would be
justified in so regarding the bricks, it seems clear that the oil or
gas on top of the ground is exactly the same oil or gas that was
beneath the ground, and that only its location has been changed
by community effort. No one would imagine that a separately
owned herd of cattle would become community property because
they were shipped from one place to another and the freight bill
paid with community funds.
Finally, in Norris v. Vaughan itself the Texas Supreme Court
squarely held that where a community property leasehold was
drilled with separate funds, this did not transform the gas pro-
duced therefrom into separate property, but the separate estate
merely had a claim for reimbursement against the community
estate for the cost of the drilling. Why should a different result
obtain in the reverse situation?
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE NATURE OF OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES
ACQUIRED IN A COMMUNITY STATE BY A DOMICILIARY
OF A COMMON LAW STATE
The next question to be investigated is the extent and manner
in which the foregoing rules apply to a case where the oil and
gas property in the community state is acquired by a domiciliary
of a common law state. In other words, the problem involves the
conflict of laws rules which have been applied by the courts in
this area.
The American conflict of laws rules with respect to marital
property are generally stated to be (1) that the law of the domi-
cile of the husband and wife at the time of acquisition determines
marital property interests in movables acquired during mar-
riage,24 and (2) that the law of the situs determines marital
property interests in immovables acquired during marriage."
Therefore, we must inquire whether oil and gas interests are
classified as movables or immovables for this purpose. In Texas
24 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §290 (1934) ; Shilkret v. Helvering, 138 F.2d
925 (D.C.Cir. 1943).
25 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §238 (1934).
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unquestionably both a mineral or royalty interest 8 and a lease-
hold interest27 would be classified as immovables for this purpose.
No direct authority on this point in California or Louisiana is
known to the author. However, in both of these states oil and gas
interests, including mineral or royalty interests and working inter-
ests, are characterized as real property or immovable property
for internal purposes.2" Therefore, it is probably safe to assume
that they would also be characterized as immovable property for
the purpose of applying the marital property conflict of laws rules.
We noted above that the rule is stated to be that the marital
property characteristics of an immovable acquired by husband or
wife during marriage are determined by the law of the situs. In
the community states property acquired during marriage other-
wise than by gift, devise or descent is community property. One
might assume, therefore, that if a husband domiciled in a com-
mon law state purchased, with funds earned during marriage, an
immovable situated in a community state, the immovable would
be community property. However, this is not true. The "tracing
doctrine," which we have discussed before, is applied in this
situation also and largely nullifies the conflict of laws rule as
above stated. The courts in Texas and California have repeatedly
held that where a domiciliary of a common law state purchases
an immovable situated in a community state, the marital prop-
erty characteristics of the immovable are determined by the
marital property characteristics of the fund with which it was
purchased, and not by the law of the situs."9 Hence, if those funds
26 Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
n.r.e.; cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 236 S.W.2d 779 (1951); Veal v.
Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
27 Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Hammonds v. Comm'r, 106
F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939); cf. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113
Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
28 La Laguna Ranch Company v. Dodge, 18 Cal.2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941);
Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal.2d 1, 53 P.2d 962 (1935); Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v.
Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935) ; Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 43 P.2d
788 (1935) ; LA. R. S. (1950), §9:1105; Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518,
41 So.2d 73 (1949) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) ; Serio v. Chad-
wick, 66 So.2d 9 (La. App. 1953); Hatch v. Morgan, 12 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1942).
29 Montgomery v. Montgomery, 101 Tex. 118, 105 S.W. 38 (1907); Thayer v.
Clarke, 77 S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903), aff'd, 98 Tex. 142, 81 S.W. 1274 (1904) ;
McDowell v. Harris, 107 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Grange v.
Kayser, 80 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Cox v. McClave, 22 S.W.2d 961
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error dism.; Estate of Arms, 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053 (1921) ;
Estate of Warner, 167 Cal. 686, 140 Pac. 583 (1914); Melvin v. Carl, 118 Cal. App.
249, 4 P.2d 954 (1931).
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were the earnings of the husband during marriage in a common
law state, and thus his separate property, the immovable pur-
chased with these funds in the community state would likewise
be separate property.
The same rule was followed by the Louisiana courts prior to
1852.80 However, in that year the Louisiana Legislature enacted
what is now Article 2400 of the Civil Code, providing that: "All
property acquired in this state by non-resident married persons
... shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate
the community of acquets and gains between citizens of this
State."81 Under this statute, a non-resident husband purchasing an
immovable in Louisiana with his separate funds must have in-
serted in the deed the "double declaration" above discussed, or
the immovable will be community property, since that is the rule
applying to citizens of Louisiana.82 As we have seen, however,
a wife is permitted to prove the separate nature of the purchase
price for an immovable purchased by her, even though no refer-
ence thereto is made in the deed.
Let us consider briefly the effect of these rules upon the rights
of a surviving spouse. In most of the common law states today
there are forced heirship or non-barrable interest statutes for
the benefit of a surviving spouse. Under such statutes, the sur-
viving spouse may renounce the will of his or her deceased spouse
and take some portion of the estate of the deceased spouse as
against the devisees and legatees named in the will. For example,
in New York a surviving spouse has a right to one-half of the
estate in fee if there are no surviving children of the deceased,
and one-third if there are, despite the contrary provisions of the
will of the deceased spouse. Suppose, however, that a husband
domiciled in New York invests funds in an immovable situated in
Texas. The immovable is not community property as we have
s0 Succession of Waterer, 25 La.Ann. 210 (1873) ; Leech v. Guild, 15 La.Ann. 349
(1860); Connor's Widow v. Administrators and Heirs of Connor, 10 La.Ann. 440
(1855), a.J'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855) ; Armorer v. Case, 9 La.Ann. 288 (1854) ;
Wolfe v. Gilmer, 7 La.Ann. 583 (1852); Huff v. Borland, 6 La.Ann. 436 (1851);
Succession of McGill, 6 La.Ann. 327 (1851).
31 Art. 2400, LA. CIv. CODE of 1870.
82 Succession of Chapman, 225 La. 641, 73 So.2d 789 (1954) ; Smith v. Gloyd, 182
La. 770, 162 So. 617 (1935); cf. Fleming v. Fleming, 211 La. 860, 30 So.2d 860
(1947) ; Rush v. Landers, 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95 (1902). The specific purpose of the
statute of 1852 was to overrule the holding of the cases cited in note 30, supra. See
the discussion in Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1924).
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seen, and therefore his wife has none of the community prop-
erty rights provided by Texas law. The non-barrable interest
statute of New York, on the other hand, is considered a law of
"succession" and the conflict of laws rule is that succession with
respect to immovables is governed by the law of the situs. There-
fore, the New York non-barrable interest statute is not applicable
upon the death of the husband. 8 Texas, of course, has no such
statute since the community property laws were designed to
accomplish exactly the same objective with respect to residents
of Texas. Hence, the wife has no interest in this Texas immovable
which cannot be defeated by the testamentary disposition of the
husband.84
If a husband domiciled in a common law state with a $10,000,-
000 estate wishes to leave all of his property to a third person
upon his death, without his wife having any right to take any
portion of it against his will, there is one simple and certain
method to accomplish this objective: invest all of the property in
Texas oil royalties. He can have all this and depletion too.
Thus far we have been considering a case where a husband or
wife domiciled in a common law state purchases with separate
funds oil and gas properties situated in a community state. Let
us now consider the case where an oil and gas property is acquired
in a community state by the personal effort of or in return for
the services of a spouse domiciled in a common law state. If the
so-called rule that the law of the situs governs the marital prop-
erty characteristics of immovable property is to have any effect,
then it must be applicable in such a situation. We have already
seen that the rule does not apply to property purchased, and
property acquired by gift, devise or descent is separate property
under the law of the community states as well as under the law
of the common law states.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held in two
cases8" that the law of the situs does govern in this case and that
immovable property acquired in a community state by a domi-
ciliary of a common law state in return for services is community
s8 Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933).
34 Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
n.r.e.; cases cited supra note 29.
8 Hammonds v. Comm'r, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939); Trapp v. United States,
177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
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property. One of the reasons the court gave for this holding was
that unless the law of the situs were held to govern in this situation,
the exceptions would have become coextensive with the rule.
One would, of course, wish to have decisions by more than one
court before saying that the law is settled on this point. The decision
of Joiner v. Joiner6 by the Texas Supreme Court, although the
point was not discussed and was perhaps not adequately con-
sidered, is a square holding to the contrary. That case involved
one of the "folk heroes" of Texas - "Dad" Joiner, the discoverer
of the East Texas oil field. Mr. Joiner and his wife were divorced,
and subsequent to the divorce she sued to establish that all of the
property acquired by him in Texas had been community property,
and that therefore an undivided one-half thereof belonged to her
after the divorce. The jury found as a fact that the parties had been
domiciled at all times in Oklahoma. The court thus described the
acquisition by Joiner of his oil interests in Texas:
About the year 1922 defendant acquired certain oil leases on lands
in East Texas by means arising solely from his own efforts and ability.
... The record clearly justifies the statement that but for the persistent,
tireless, and almost heroic fortitude and efforts of defendant in the
matter of making the discovery of oil, these leases would never have
been of any substantial value to him.8 7
But after reciting the jury finding that Joiner and his wife were
domiciled at all times in Oklahoma, the court held that: "This
takes out of the case all questions of title in plaintiff [the ex-Mrs.
Joiner] by reason of the law of this state."3
It seems fairly clear, under the facts as stated by the court,
that the leases would have been community property by the rule of
Norris v. Vaughan if acquired by a domiciliary of Texas, even if
some small bonus were paid with separate funds of the husband.
Therefore, the case seems to be squarely opposed to the holdings
of the Tenth Circuit although that court attempted to distinguish it.
At the moment, however, the weight of the slight existing author-
ity seems to favor the view that an oil and gas interest in a com-
munity state acquired by a domiciliary of a common law state by
personal efforts or in return for services is community property.
36 131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938).
87 Id. at 33, 112 S.W.2d at 1052.
88 Id. at 30, 112 S.W.2d at 1050.
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Before leaving this topic we should consider briefly what effect
the acquisition of the oil and gas interest through the instrumen-
tality of a corporation or a partnership will have. If a spouse
domiciled in a common law state acquires stock in a corporation
which in turn owns or acquires oil and gas properties in a com-
munity state, the corporate stock is of course movable property,
and the marital property interests therein and also any rights of
succession with respect thereto are governed by the law of the
domicile.89 The law of the community state has no application at
all, regardless of how the stock is acquired.
As to what effect the intervention of a partnership may have,
there seems to be almost no authority. It could be argued that the
partnership should be considered an entity for this purpose, as it
is considered for some purposes in the law; that it is the partner-
ship entity which owns or acquires the immovabl in the commun-
ity state; and that the spouse domiciled in the common law state
acquires merely an interest in the partnership, which is a movable
and governed in all cases with respect to marital property rights
by the law of the domicile. No cases are known where this argu-
ment has been made. In one case40 the Tax Court ignored the part-
nership entity, if there is such a thing, and considered the married
partner domiciled in the common law state as owning an undivided
interest in the immovable situated in the community state. How-
ever, the point was not argued or discussed, so that the case is
scarcely an authority on the point.
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE NATURE OF INCOME RECEIVED By
A DOMICILIARY OF A COMMON LAW STATE FROM AN
IMMOVABLE SITUATED IN A COMMUNITY STATE
Assuming that the nature of the immovable property owned by
a domiciliary of a common law state and situated in the commu-
nity state has been determined as community or separate property,
what will be the nature of the income from that property accrued
during marriage? For example, in Texas and Louisiana the income
from the separate property of one spouse during marriage is com-
munity property, as we have seen. Does that rule apply to the in-
89 Wells v. Hiskett, 288 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error rel. n.r.e.
4 0 Benjamin H. McElhinney, Jr., 17 T.C. 7 (1951).
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come from an immovable situated in Texas or Louisiana and
owned by a domiciliary of a common law state?
Two theoretical approaches might be suggested to this question.
First, it might be said that the rents and revenues from the immov-
able property are themselves movable property acquired during
marriage, and therefore under the general rule any marital prop-
erty characteristics therein are governed by the law of the domicile.
Second, it might be said that the nature of the rents and revenues
as separate or community property is merely one of the character-
istics of the ownership of the immovable. Since the ownership of
the immovable, and the marital property characteristics therein,
are governed by the law of the situs, the nature of the rents and
revenues as community or separate is also governed by the law of
the situs.
This question would be more important in Louisiana than in
Texas, of course, since in the former state all income from sep-
arately owned oil and gas interests is considered to be in the nature
of rent and is community under the local law. In Texas, on the
other hand, bonuses and royalties from separately owned property
are separate property, just as they would be under the law of the
common law state of domicile.
In Commissioner v. Skaggs" a husband domiciled in Texas
owned separate realty in California. Under California law the
rent from separate realty was separate, whereas under Texas law
it was community. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held in a 2 to 1 decision that the law of the situs governed
the nature of the income. This decision has been followed by
the Supreme Court of New Mexico with respect to income from
immovable property situated in that state and owned by a domi-
ciliary of Texas and by the Tax Court with respect to immovable
property owned in Texas by a domiciliary of a common law state."'
If the immovable in the community state is itself determined to
be community property, then of course the common law state of
41 122 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1941) ; cf. Succession
of Robinson, 23 La.Ann. 174 (1871). Despite the statement in the headnote, this latter
case is not a clear holding on the point.
42 In re Clark's Will, 59 N.M. 433, 285 P.2d 795 (1955) ; Benjamin H. McElhinney,
Jr., 17 T.C. 7 (1951); W. D. Johnson, 1 T.C. 1041 (1943), af'd, 153 F.2d 348 (5th
Cir. 1946); cf. John O'Neil, 16 B.T.A. 614 (1929).
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the domicile has no law with respect to the nature of income from
community property. It would seem that the law of the situs must
necessarily govern with respect to the income from community
property. To hold that such income was the separate property of
either spouse would probably be unconstitutional.
EFFECT OF TRANSPORTATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTO
COMMON LAW STATE OF DOMICILE
The final problem to be considered concerns the effect of the
transportation of community property from the community state,
where it is acquired, to the common law state of the domicile. For
example, a husband domiciled in a common law state acquires an
immovable in a community state in return for services. We will
assume that such immovable, as held by the Tenth Circuit, is
community property. It, of course, cannot be transported back to
the common law domiciliary state. Suppose, however, that in-
come is received from this property or that the property is sold.
The income or the sale price is also community property at the
moment it is received in the community state. The husband, how-
ever, takes this movable property back to the domiciliary state
and there invests it in movable or immovable property. What is the
nature of the ownership of that property in the domiciliary state?
On principle, it would seem that there could be only one answer
to this question. If the property was community property the mo-
ment before it was transported across the state line into the com-
mon law jurisdiction, it must still be community property after
it crosses the line. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Edwards v. Edwards" and the Missouri Supreme Court in Depas
v. Mayo" have stated in dictum that property thus brought into
a common law state would be owned as a tenancy in common be-
tween the husband and his wife, each owning an undivided one-
half interest.
What the Oklahoma and Missouri courts apparently did not
realize was that a tenancy in common between husband and wife is
more unlike community property than is the husband's separate
property in the common law states. Community property is in gen-
48 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924).
44 11 Mo. 314 (1848).
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eral liable for the husband's debts, and not for those of the wife,
whereas one-half of property held by such a tenancy in common is
liable for the debts of each co-tenant. The husband can in general
convey movable community property for value without the joinder
of the wife, whereas each such tenant in common can transfer
one-half, and only one-half, of the property owned in common.
The husband is entitled to the management and control of com-
munity property, whereas each tenant in common has an equal
right to the management of the property owned in common. It
would be difficult to find any legal question arising inter vivos
with respect to which the characteristics of community property
and such a tenancy in common do not differ.
It might be suggested that the real reason for these statements
by the common law courts is a feeling that community property is
a sort of contagion which must be quarantined at the border long
enough to be transformed into a species of property which the
common law court can understand. However, this would not seem
to be sufficient reason to transform the property into a type of own-
ership which it would not be under the operative facts by the law
of any jurisdiction whatever." A serious question would exist as
to whether a decision to that effect might not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSIONS: APPLICATION OF FOREGOING PRINCIPLES
To HYPOTHETICAL CASE
We are now in a position to consider the solution to the questions
raised by the facts of the hypothetical case stated earlier.
45 Compare Succession of Packwood, 9 Rob. 438, 12 Rob. 334 (La. 1845); Suc-
cession of Popp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1919) ; King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201
S.W.2d 803 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947). The Supreme Courts of Virginia
and Montana have held that community property transported into those states from
California may be subjected to a gift tax or inheritance tax as though it were the
husband's separate property. Commonwealth v. Terjen, 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 801
(1956); In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951). These holdings
are clearly inconsistent with any holding that such community property is transformed
into a tenancy in common, and in fact go to the opposite extreme of holding that, for
state tax purposes at least, it is transformed into the husband's separate property.
However, these decisions are based on the holdings of the California courts that the
wife does not have a "vested interest" in California community property, which the
Virginia and Montana courts deny were overruled by the enactment of Section 161a of
the CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE in 1927. Therefore. these decisions, aside from being pretty
clearly wrong, would not be applicable to community property originating in any
state other than California. See Stone v. Sample, 216 Miss. 287, 62 So.2d 307, 63
So.2d 555 (1953), as to community property transported from Texas into Mississippi.
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It will be recalled that Smith acquired a one-third working in-
terest in Tract A as the consideration for the services performed
by him for his two friends who advanced the funds for the ac-
quisition of this interest. If the decisions of the Tenth Circuit are
correct, this working interest was the community property of Mr.
and Mrs. Smith. So also was the income received from the oil
runs from that property. What about the building in St. Louis
purchased with this income? If that building were community
property, only one-half thereof would be includible as a part of
the gross estate of each spouse for estate tax purposes, and in ad-
dition there would be a stepped-up basis on the entire building
upon the death of Mrs. Smith in 1955 for income tax purposes.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that there is a stepped-up
basis upon the entire community property (not merely one-half
thereof) upon the death of either spouse, if at least one-half of
the whole thereof is includible in the gross estate of the deceased
spouse." In that event, there would be no income tax payable upon
the sale of the building after the death of Mrs. Smith, since there
would be no gain on the sale.
On the other hand, if the dicta of the Missouri and Oklahoma
courts are correct and the property was transformed into a tenancy
in common by being transported to the common law state, although
only one-half of the value of the building would be includible in
the gross estate of each spouse, since each would only own an un-
divided one-half, there would be a stepped-up basis only upon
Mrs. Smith's undivided one-half upon her death and not upon the
one-half belonging to Mr. Smith. Therefore, there would be a cap-
ital gains tax payable upon the sale with respect to one-half of the
excess of the sales price over the original adjusted basis.
It would seem that the first result is clearly the correct one, but
it cannot be asserted that the matter has been settled one way or the
other by judicial authority.
With respect to the working interest in Tract B, it will be re-
called that Mr. Smith acquired this property for a bonus payment
of $10,000 from his separate property acquired in Missouri. How-
ever, it is also true that he acquired it partly as the result of per-
sonal efforts and enterprise. That portion of the property attribut-
4 6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1014 (b) (6).
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able to the bonus payment was undoubtedly the separate property
of Mr. Smith. Under the theory of Norris v. Vaughan that portion
of the leasehold attributable to the personal efforts of Mr. Smith
would be community property. How any such allocation can be
made has not been explained by the Texas courts, but we may as-
sume that the trial court will be permitted to make an arbitrary
guess, unless the decision of Norris v. Vaughan is to be overruled.
It will be recalled, however, that this leasehold was drilled with
community funds (a portion of the income from Tract A) and
through the personal efforts of Mr. Smith. Therefore, if one is to
accept the ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the inti-
mations in the opinion in Norris v. Vaughan as representing the
Texas law, the income from even the portion of the leasehold which
was Mr. Smith's separate property would be community property
under the law of the situs. And if one accepts the decision of the
majority in Commissioner v. Skaggs, the law of the situs would
determine this question.
Therefore, an argument could be made that all of the income
from Tract B as well as Tract A was community property. If that
is true, then only one-half of the General Motors stock purchased
with this income would be includible in the gross estate of each
spouse. This would be so whether or not the ownership is con-
sidered to have been transformed into a tenancy in common by the
transportation of the property to Missouri.
With respect to the mineral interest in Tract C purchased by
Mr. Smith with his separate funds, it is clear that this was the
separate property of Mr. Smith, unless the principle of Norris v.
Vaughan is to be extended to a mineral or royalty interest as well
as a working interest. Logically, there is no reason why it could
not be so extended if the husband spent a substantial amount of
time "scouting" for the royalty interest which he purchases with
his separate funds. However, the court will probably find that
it has created too many problems for itself in connection with
working interests for it to open this Pandora's box with respect to
royalty interests also.
If the mineral interest in Tract C was Mr. Smith's separate
property, then so also under the Texas law were the bonuses and
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royalty payments received with respect to that interest and the
other oil properties purchased in Texas with those funds.
Hence, all of this property must be included in the gross estate
of Mr. Smith, and none of it is includible in the gross estate of Mrs.
Smith. With respect to the sale made by Mr. Smith after the death
of Mrs. Smith, a capital gains tax would have to be paid with
respect to the entire excess of the sales price over the adjusted
basis of the property in the hands of Mr. Smith.
It should be noted that the facts of this hypothetical case have
been unrealistically simplified in order to present more clearly the
legal issues which are in themselves by no means simple. One
would never expect to find a situation where the proceeds of these
different properties would be so segregated as to be easily trace-
able into the different properties owned at death. Normally, these
proceeds would be co-mingled with each other and with other
property and would be largely unidentifiable.
In the case of a person dying domiciled in a community state,
the rule applicable in such a case is that all of the property on hand
at the death of either husband or wife is presumed to be commun-
ity property unless clearly shown to be separate. Without this
principle, the whole system might have collapsed long ago from
its own complexities.
This presumption, however, is not applicable in the case of a
person dying domiciled in a common law state. Hence, in that
case an effort must be made to untie the Gordian knot.
